In this paper, we analyse a continuous time version of Fish Wars with the infinite time horizon and state dependent constraints on controls. We calculate the social optimum and a Nash equilibrium which always leads to the depletion of the resource even if the social optimum results in the...

In the research presented in this paper, we analyse a model of Fish Wars, first introduced by Levhari and Mirman, restricted to finite time horizon. We study it both by analytic and numerical methods and compare results. Our study suggests possibility of using numerical methods for dynamic games...

Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are non-linear in stock and...

Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed whether these deviations towards the...

Scientific evidence reveals that renewable resource stock dynamics are subject to uncertainty due to changes in environmental conditions. Despite its critical impacts on management, little is known about the effects of such uncertainty on the formation of regional fisheries management...

The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a subsidy mechanism intended to induce adjacent landowners to coordinate environmental conservation activities. This paper explores the effects of landowner group size on spatial coordination under the AB in laboratory experiments where players are located on...

A nonlinear differential game is developed with the industry and the government as two actors that act independently of each other with different objectives and different time preferences in the second best solution. The industry is concerned about the profit stream from the production of a...

A two-person general-sum repeated game with vanishing actions is an infinitely repeated game where the players face the following restrictions. Each action must be used by player k ∈ {1,2} at least once in every rk ∈ ℕ consecutive stages, otherwise the action vanishes for the remaining...