A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable …

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and … performance of our mechanism. Finally, we discuss how the mechanism can be applied to award R&D subsidies. …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable …. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a procurement mechanism that can be viewed as a … truthtelling in dominant strategies, is ex-post rational, and satisfies the hard budget constraint. Our mechanism obtains an …

This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants … procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability …