In standard Walrasian macro-finance models, pecuniary externalities such as fire sales lead to overinvestment in illiquid assets or underprovision of liquidity. We investigate whether imperfect competition (Cournot) improves welfare through internalizing the externality and find that this is far...

I analyze the rapidly growing literature about systemic risk in financial markets and find an important commonality. Systemic risk is regarded to be an endogenous outcome of interactions by rational agents on imperfect markets. Market imperfections give rise to systemic externalities which cause...

I analyze the rapidly growing literature about systemic risk in financial markets and find an important commonality. Systemic risk is regarded to be an endogenous outcome of interactions by rational agents on imperfect markets. Market imperfections give rise to systemic externalities which cause...

We develop a model in which a financial intermediary's investment in risky assets - risk taking - is excessive due to limited liability and deposit insurance and characterize the policy tools that implement efficient risk taking. In the calibrated model, coordinating interest rate policy with...

We develop a model in which a financial intermediary's investment in risky assets - risk taking - is excessive due to limited liability and deposit insurance, and characterize the policy tools that implement efficient risk taking. In the calibrated model, coordinating interest rate policy with...

Makroprudenzielle Politik hat das Ziel, die Stabilität des Finanzsystems zu überwachen und zu sichern. Systemrisiken entstehen, wenn Schieflagen in Teilen des Finanzsystems die Funktionsweise der Finanzmärkte und damit die realwirtschaftliche Entwicklung beeinträchtigen. Ziel dieser Politik...

Before the beginning of the crisis in 2007–8, regulation failed to cope with the complexities of modern finance and paid insufficient attention to systemic risk. Similarly, risk managers in financial institutions tended to focus on risks in their financial institutions, neglecting systemic...

The paper shows that the time-consistent policy of public bailout affects the private liquidity choice of banks in several ways. First, banks anticipate public support in a liquidity crisis and seek large and socially inefficient exposures to shadow banking, defined as a privately costly...

In this paper, we use a DSGE model to study the passive and time-varying implementation of macroprudential policy when policymakers have noisy and lagged data, as commonly observed in low income and developing countries (LIDCs). The model features an economy with two agents; households and...

This paper assesses the effectiveness of lending restriction measures, such as loan-to-value and debt-service-to-income ratios, in affecting developments in house prices and credit. We use data on 99 lending standard restrictions implemented in 28 EU countries over 1990-2018. The results suggest...