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The relation between CEO control and the risk of CEO compensation

Toyne, Michael F.; Millar, James A.; Dixon, Bruce L. - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 6 (2000) 3, pp. 291-306

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001501679

Konflikte zwischen Aktionären und Managern : Lösungsmöglichkeiten im Rahmen des deutschen und britischen Corporate-Governance-Modells

Varga von Kibed, Gabriele - 2001 - 1. Aufl.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001609945

Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance

Core, John E.; Holthausen, Robert W.; Larcker, David F. - In: Journal of financial economics 51 (1999) 3, pp. 371-406

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001354073

CEOs serving simultaneously as board chairperson : a collision of theories

Dalton, Dan R.; Daily, Catherine M. - In: Business & the contemporary world 10 (1998) 4, pp. 561-578

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001365385

What happens to CEOs after they retire? : New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives

Brickley, James A.; Linck, James S.; Coles, Jeffrey L. - In: Journal of financial economics 52 (1999) 3, pp. 341-377

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001394608

Leadership structure : separating the CEO and chairman of the Board

Brickley, James A. - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 3 (1997) 3, pp. 189-220

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001230256

CEO age and outside directors : a hazard analysis

Geddes, Raymond Richard - In: Review of industrial organization : RIO 12 (1997) 5, pp. 767-780

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001230339

Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures

Almazan, Andres; Suárez, Javier - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 58 (2003) 2, pp. 519-547

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750570

Board of Director Collusion, Managerial Incentives and Firm Values

Andergassen, Rainer - 2011

governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119061

Board Independence and the Design of Executive Compensation

Singh, Ravi - 2007

Executive compensation serves as a metric by which investors measure the quality of a firm's governance. In this paper, I explore how the signaling role of executive compensation impacts the compensation decisions of boards. I show that reputational concerns often cause boards to adopt pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732156

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