The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several approximations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...

The cost sharing rule derived from the Shapley value is the unique sharing rule which allocates fixed costs uniformly

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since thenseveral axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed tocost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...

A group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non-rival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms...

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are...

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are...

We study a particular class of cost sharing games - quot;data gamesquot; - covering situations where some players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. The problem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive but generally not...

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...

Two well-known single valued solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value and Solidarity value, which verify three properties: Linearity, Symmetry and Efficiency, and the null player axiom. On the other hand, the interpretation of the two values is usually related on the marginal contribution of...

This survey captures the main contributions in the area described by the title that were published up to 1997. (Unfortunately, it does not capture all of them.) The variations that are the subject of this chapter are those axiomatically characterized solutions which are obtained by varying...