Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a...

Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a...

This paper considers a multi-unit ascending auction with two players and common values. A large set of equilibria in this model is not robust to a small reputational perturbation. In particular, if there is a positive probability that there is a type who always demands many units, regardless of...

Recently Talman and Yang (2008) examined an assignment market under price control. In the market a number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder has a valuation on each item. The seller has a reservation price for every item. Meanwhile every item has a ceiling...

This paper investigates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in an ascending-price core-selecting auction, which is recently used in some countriesʼ spectrum license auctions. We suppose that there are two identical items, two small bidders, and one large bidder. The small bidders demand only one...

A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder demands at most one item. The price of each item is not completely flexible and is restricted to some admissible interval. In such a market economy with price rigidities, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to...

 A social planner wishes to launch a project but the contenders capable of running the project are cash-constrained and may default.  To signal their capabilities, the contenders may finance their bids through debt or equity, depending on the mechanism chosen by the social planner.  When...

Using a unique sample of comparable online and in-person loan transactions, we study the determinants of arm's-length and inside lending focusing on the differential information content across debt types. We find that soft private information primarily underlies relationship lending whereas hard...

Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some valuations...

It is commonly assumed in private value auctions that bidders have no information about the realization of the other bidders' valuations. Nevertheless, an informative public signal about the realization may be released by a bidder while he learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete...