We show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government can (and will) implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public firm fully public. The scheme requires taxing outputs and subsidizing...

We examine whether the outcome of bargaining over wage and employment between an incumbent firm and a union remains efficient under entry threat. The workers\' reservation wage is not known to the entrant, and entry is profitable only against the high reservation wage. The entrant observes the...

We show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government will implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public firm fully public. The scheme requires taxing outputs and subsidizing abatements at...

We show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government can implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public firm fully public. The scheme requires taxing outputs and subsidizing abatements at...

Considering a differentiated mixed duopoly we show that when privatization and pollution tax are used together environmental damage will be non-monotone in the level of privatization, and optimal privatization is always partial privatization. Whether privatization will improve the environment or...