A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferencesis that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preferencetypes are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this resultis due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynam-ics some Bayesian...

A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preference types are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this result is due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynamics some...

This paper examines the reflexive interplay between individual decisions and social forces to analyze the evolution of cooperation in the presence of "multi-directedness," whereby people's preferences depend on their psychological motives. People have access to multiple, discrete motives....

This paper examines the reflexive interplay between individual decisions and social forces to analyze the evolution of cooperation in the presence of "multi-directedness," whereby people's preferences depend on their psychological motives. People have access to multiple, discrete motives....

This paper examines the reflexive interplay between individual decisions and social forces to analyze the evolution of cooperation in the presence of "multi-directedness", whereby people's preferences depend on their psychological motives. People have access to multiple, discrete motives....

Experimental implementations of dictator games are found to differ in terms of their underlying strategic incentives. We explore this discovery in two separate directions. Theoretically, assuming identical other-regarding preferences, we show that the two most widely used protocols can generate...

In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill the expectations of others, plays out more strongly if agents share an induced social identity. Participants play a dictator game in which they can condition their amount sent on recipients' beliefs....

This paper examines evolutionary stability of emotions in an evolutionary game that repeats infinitely a stage game. In the stage game, players who survived in the previous game compete for survival in pairs. The players are classified into two types: One type is the altruist and another is the...

This paper develops an evolutionary approach to investigate (i) whether the observability of altruism or envy evolved in humans through a process of natural selection, (ii) what causes individuals to choose altruism or envy, and (iii) whether the survival of individuals coincides with the...

Using a large-scale hybrid laboratory and online trust experiment with and without pre-play communication, we investigate how the passage of time affects trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation. Communication (predominantly through promises) raises cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by...