The rule of reason is the standard for testing whether a restraint of trade violates the Sherman Act. The thesis of this article is that the only issue under the rule of reason is the impact of a restraint on the competitive process; the Sherman Act does not employ a welfare standard. This...

We propose a simple method for predicting price effects from mergers between branded retail chains competing in many local markets. When past mergers created markets with the same number of brands but different numbers of brand owners, price data at a single point in time exhibit between-market...

Inconvenient truths prevent econometric merger retrospective studies from substantially altering our understanding of competitive effects from horizontal mergers. Econometrics cannot definitively determine the effects of particular mergers, and if they could, econometric merger retrospectives...

In FTC v. Lundbeck, courts rejected a challenge to an acquisition placing under common control the only two drugs for treating a heart defect in newborns. Although the court decisions in the case have been severely criticized, they might well have achieved the right result for the right reason....

The digital economy presents challenges for antitrust law, but changes in substantive antitrust law are not needed to cope with them. The biggest problem in antitrust today is that the courts impose excessive burdens on plaintiffs, but no constructive solution to that problem is evident, and...

European enforcers have brought high-profile antitrust cases against the tech giants, and both activists and members of Congress are calling for action in the United States. This short note identifies ten hard-wired differences between the European and American enforcement regimes that make very...

Horizontal mergers give rise to unilateral anticompetitive effects if they cause the merged firm to act less intensely competitive than the merging firms, while non-merging rivals do not alter their competitive strategies. This chapter describes the economic theory underlying unilateral...

Under the leadership of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to cast aside the Court's prior antitrust decisions. The qualified per se rule applicable to tying surely will not survive much longer, but what else might be in store is more...

The discourse on competition policy often uses the term quot;consumer welfarequot; but rarely is clear about its meaning or role. I address the meaning and role of quot;consumer welfarequot; in three discrete essays. The first reviews key economic concepts and the usage of the term quot;consumer...

The New Brandeis School renews debate on two fundamental antitrust policy questions: 1) what source of wisdom or set of values should inform antitrust rules; and 2) what criterion should govern antitrust case adjudication. In our view, the Chicago School's answer to the first question was right;...