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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values

van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010

characterizes the corresponding delta-discounted Shapley value. Moreover, we provide a strategic implementation of these solutions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045005

J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice"

Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013

The article shows how Jean-Francois Mertens contributed to the development of game theory and microeconomics as we know them today. Along with about 80 articles, Mertens's topics go from the formulation of Bayesian decision making in games with incomplete information to the foundations of cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074149

Shapley, Lloyd S.(1923)

Qin, Manel Baucells Raul Lejano Cheng-Zhong - Palgrave Macmillan

Lloyd Shapley is considered one of the pioneers of game theory. His most prominent contributions are the inception and study of value theory and core theory. These two theories are the key to solving problems involving the allocation of goods or payoffs achievable through cooperation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011141073

The Probabilistic Representative Values

Lorenzo-Freire, S.; Casas-Mendez, B. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2005

In this paper we define a new family of solutions for the class of cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the set of players exhibits a structure of a priori unions.This family is deeply connected with the Shapley value for games with transferable utility but, moreover, we assume...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091510

Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293711

A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2012

In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326336

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582516

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - 2009

is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

Kóczy, László Á. - 2009

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279466

Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: Time for retirement?

Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496060