Increasing interest has recently been shown in analyzing the worst-case behavior of local search algorithms. In particular, the quality of local optima and the time needed to find the local optima by the simplest form of local search has been studied. This paper deals with worst-case performance...

Our work contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of bargaining by providing additional non-cooperative support to the well-known Nash bargaining solution. In particular, in the present paper we study a model of non-cooperative multilateral bargaining with a very general proposer selection...

We consider graphs that can be embedded on a surface of bounded genus such that each edge has a bounded number of crossings. We prove that many optimization problems, including maximum independent set, minimum vertex cover, minimum dominating set and many others, admit polynomial time...

We consider a revenue maximization problem where we are selling a set of m items, each of which available in a certain quantity (possibly unlimited) to a set of n bidders. Bidders are single minded, that is, each bidder requests exactly one subset, or bundle of items. Each bidder has a valuation...

We consider the single-item discrete lot-sizing and scheduling problem. We present a partial linear description of the convex hull of feasible solutions that solves this problem in the presence of Wagner-Whitin costs.

Consider a situation in which a company sells several different items to a set of customers. However, the company is not satisfied with the current pricing strategy and wishes to implement new prices for the items. Implementing these new prices in one single step mightnot be desirable, for...

We investigate the algorithmic performance of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in the single item case. We provide a formal definition of a Vickrey algorithm for this framework, and give a number of examples of Vickrey algorithms. We consider three performance criteria, one corresponding to a...

In this paper we analyze equilibria in competitive environments under constraints across players'' strategies. This means that the action taken by one player limits the possible choices of the other players. In this context the classical approach, Kakutani''s Fixed Point theorem, does not work....

More often than not production processes are the joint endeavor of people having different abilities and productivities. Such production processes and the associated surplus production are often not fully transparent in the sense that the relative contributions of involved agents are blurred;...