The present paper provides a model of coopetitive game for environmental sustainability of a global green economy, looking for a win-win solution within a complex construct of a type originally devised by Branderburger and Nalebuff. The model here suggested is environmental sustainable since it...

This paper provides a coopetitive model for a global green economy taking into account the environmental sustainability. In particular we propose a differentiable coopetitive game G (in the sense recently introduced by D. Carfì) to represent a basic green economy interaction among a country c...

The present paper provides a model of coopetitive game for environmental sustainability of a global green economy, looking for a win-win solution within a complex construct of a type originally devised by Branderburger and Nalebuff. The model here suggested is environmental sustainable since it...

We use a field experiment to identify how differences in preferences and autonomy in decision-making result in low willingness-to-pay (WTP) for technologies that can benefit all members of the household. We create income earning opportunities to empower households and elicit their WTP for fuel,...

In the context of bilateral bargaining, we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue cooperative bargaining model. In contrast to the traditional Nash bargaining literature, the axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. We characterize a new solution that we call...

We use a field experiment to identify how differences in preferences and autonomy in decision-making result in low willingness-to-pay (WTP) for technologies that can benefit all members of the household. We create income earning opportunities to empower households and elicit their WTP for fuel,...

In the context of bilateral bargaining,we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue-two-players cooperative bargaining model. The axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. A family of bargaining rule stands out: the monotonic equal net ratio solutions. These...

I investigate when a exible bargaining agenda, where side payments are possible, facilitates cooperation in a context with strategic delegation. On the one hand, allowing side payments may be necessary when one partys participation constraint otherwise would be violated. On the other, with side...

This paper aims to contribute to understanding the existing knowledge gaps in the linkages of energy, water, and land use in Southeast Asia and explores the political economy of energy transition in the Mekong region (MR). Investigating the struggle over hydropower development and...

This paper aims to contribute to understanding the existing knowledge gaps in the linkages of energy, water, and land use in Southeast Asia and explores the political economy of energy transition in the Mekong region (MR). Investigating the struggle over hydropower development and...