In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dissolution. Each individual who has a nontransferable expected utility about the quality of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or...

I characterize the proportional N-person bargaining solutions by individual rationality, translation invariance, feasible set continuity, and a new axiom - interim improvement. The latter says that if the disagreement point d is known, but the feasible set is not - it may be either S or T, where...

The paper develops a negotiation model for flexicurity-relevant collective bargaining. Flexicurity is a European labour market policy which should compensate the ongoing flexibilization of employment relations by advances in employment security and social security. Flexibility is promoted by...

The paper is an overview of over 30 publications on six models with flexicurity indicators developed at the Hans-Böckler-Foundation for monitoring and analysis of flexicurity. The latter is a new European labour market policy which should compensate the ongoing flexibilization of employment...

This paper introduces &tao;-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School Choice Problems. We show that, by considering a weak notion of equity that we refer to as ¿-equity, it is possible to contribute positively to solve an open debate, originated by the...

We study the effect of different school choice mechanisms on schools' incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off whenever that school becomes more preferred by...

Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a "dating" process in which all partners enjoy the full potential...

Bargaining is prevalent in economic interactions. Under complete information, game theory predicts efficient bargaining outcomes (immediate acceptance of first offer) (see Rubinstein, 1982). However, continuous rejections of offers leading to inefficient delays (escalation) have regularly been...

We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium when exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. The estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state...

Some labor markets have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms, e.g. the signaling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers....