I study the robustness of Rubinstein's (1989) E-Mail Game results by varying the information that players can utilize. The article follows one of Morris' (2002) reactions to the E-Mail game "that one should try to come up with a model of boundedly rational behavior that delivers predictions that...

The pre-nucleolus is a popular egalitarian solution concept for cost-sharing games. A drawback of this concept is that an associated cost allocation often cannot be calculated in polynomial time. Therefore, it would be convenient to know whether the pre-nucleolus of a particular game coincides...

A network is a graph where the nodes represent players and the links represent bilateral interaction between the players. A reward game assigns a value to every network on a fixed set of players. An allocation scheme specifies how to distribute the worth of every network among the players. This...

Weiss (1981) established core equivalence and the existence of competitive equilibria in finitely additive exchange economies. To underline the relevance of finitely additive economies we present in this note an example with a close connection to finite exchange economies.

Determining the productivity of individual workers engaged in team production is difficult. Monitoring expenses may be high, or the observable output of the entire team may be some single product. One way to collect information about individual productivity is to observe how total output changes...

This paper analyses whether the effect of compensation of former spouses after divorce has an impact on the probability of divorces occurring. In particular, it is assumed that the income difference after divorce is shared equally between former spouses, in line with rules in Germany. The...

The general approach for the pricing of rainbow (or colored) options with fixed transaction costs is developed from the game theoretic point of view. The evolution of the underlying common stocks is considered in discrete time. The main result consists in the explicit calculation of the hedge...

Recently it is proved that all infinite assignment games have a non-empty core. Using this fact, and a technique suggested by L. S. Shapley for finite permutation games, we prove similar results for infinite permutation games. Infinite transportation games can be interpreted as a generalization...