We extend the notion of an ordinally symmetric game of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) from two to n players. We prove that each ordinally symmetric game with two strategies is an ordinal potential game and thus possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, generalizing a result of Hofbauer and...

Games with strategic substitutes (GSS) are generally less tractable than games with strategic complements (GSC). This paper revisits the GSC versus GSS comparison by establishing a novel connection between them. We show through a network perspective that, when the strategy set of each player is...

Horizontal firms frequently pool their resources together and operate in a collective way to fully utilize the economies of scale and scope, and how to share the obtained profit is a central problem. A standard approach for studying this problem is to represent it as a set function and apply the...

Gagnon and Goyal (2017) develop an elegant model to understand the interaction between community and markets. One key argument is that, among others, whether markets and social ties are substitutes or complements plays a decisive role: markets undermine social ties in the case of substitutes and...

Shapley (1955) introduced the model of an abstract market game as a generalization of the assignment game model, among several other models. He conjectured that abstract market games possess non-empty cores. We analyze properties of abstract market games and provide a proof of this conjecture...