We prove that every continuous value on a space of vector measure market games $Q$, containing the space of nonatomic measures $NA$, has the \textit{conic property}, i.e., if a game $v\in Q$ coincides with a nonatomic measure $\nu$ on a conical diagonal neighborhood then $\varphi(v)=\nu$. We...

We study non-zero-sum continuous-time stochastic games, also known as continuous-time Markov games, of fixed duration. We concentrate on Markovian strategies. We show by way of example that equilibria need not exist in Markovian strategies, but they always exist in Markovian public-signal...

A new and fast learning method is described in the context of teaching a program to play chess. A theory of the meaning of a position evaluation is developed, and is then confronted with a large collection of games played by masters or other programs. The program learns by fitting its evaluation...

We prove that a single-valued solution of perfectly competitive TU economies underling nonatomic exact market games is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always a core element, this result provides an axiomatization of the...

We extend Aumann's theorem (Aumann, 1987) in deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion,...

In performing skill-based tasks individuals often face a choice between easier, less demanding alternatives, but ones whose expected payoffs in case of success are lower, and difficult, more demanding alternatives whose expected payoffs in case of success are higher: What piece to play in a...

We prove that a single-valued solution of perfectly competitive TU economies underling nonatomic vector measure market games is uniquely determined as the Mertens (1988) value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result...

Among the single-valued solution concepts studied in cooperative game theory and economics, those which are also positive projections play an important role. The value, semivalues, and quasivalues of a cooperative game are several examples of solution concepts which are positive projections....

We consider a basic dynamic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a best-reply (or better-reply) selection mechanism. A state is evolutionarily stable if its long-term relative frequency of occurrence is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate decreases to zero. We prove that, for all...

A population that can be joined at a known sequence of discrete times is sampled cross-sectionally, and the sojourn times of individuals in the sample are observed. It is well known that cross-sectioning leads to length-bias, but less well known that it may result also in dependence among the...