We study a monopolist that uses the following scheme to gauge market traction for its common-value, excludible product. The monopolist offers its product at a given price, and each potential consumer decides whether to buy it. The contributions are collected. The product is supplied only if the...

We study a delegation problem within a Bayesian persuasion framework with the aim of understanding the incentive design of representatives. We are doing so by adding a preplay stage to the standard Bayesian persuasion model in which the receiver is allowed to choose a representative in order to...

This paper provides a model of social learning where the order in which actions are taken is determined by an $m$-dimensional integer lattice rather than along a line as in the herding model. The observation structure is determined by a random network. Every agent links to each of his preceding...

Two firms produce substitute goods of unknown quality. At each stage the firms set prices and a consumer with private information and unit demand buys from one of the firms. Both firms and consumers see the entire history of prices and purchases. Will such markets aggregate information? Will the...

We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information...