We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the facility. A mechanism maps the locations reported by the agents...

We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(logm), where m is the number of...

A response to criticism of the paper "On the Matter of the Man with Three Wives," Moriah 22 (1999), 98- 107 (see also Rationality Center DP 102, June 1996). The Moriah paper is a non- mathematical account, written in Hebrew for the Rabbinic public, of "Game- Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy...

A few species within the genus Colchicum of the Colchicaceae family, a small group of species native to the transitional belt of the Mediterranean and the Middle East deserts, are characterized by unique morphological traits: nectarial appendages that occur at the base of the perianth segments...

This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional procedures because it relies on endogenous cycle lengths, which are defined by the number of...

While the very first consensus protocols for the synchronous model were designed to match the <I>worst-case</I> lower bound, deciding in exactly t+1 rounds in all runs, it was soon realized that they could be strictly improved upon by <I>early stopping</I> protocols. These dominate the first ones, by always...</i></i>

We introduce asymptotic analysis of stochastic games with short-stage duration. The play of stage $k$, $k\geq 0$, of a stochastic game $\Gamma_\delta$ with stage duration $\delta$ is interpreted as the play in time $k\delta\leq t<(k+1)\delta$, and therefore the average payoff of the $n$-stage play per unit of time is the sum of the payoffs in the first $n$ stages divided by $n\delta$, and the $\lambda$-discounted present value of a payoff $g$ in stage $k$ is $\lambda^{k\delta} g$. We define convergence, strong convergence, and exact convergence of the data of a family $(\Gamma_\delta)_{\delta>0}$ as the stage duration $\delta$ goes to $0$, and study the...</(k+1)\delta$,>

Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market allocation that <I>prima facie</I> seems anticompetitive? We introduce a model in which service providers aim at optimizing the number of customers who use their services, while customers aim at choosing service providers with minimal customer...</i>

Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as <i>women</i> there) can strategically force the W-optimal stable matching as the M-optimal one by truncating their preference lists, each woman possibly blacklisting <i>all but...</i>