This article presents a classroom game in which students choose whether or not to comply with pollution regulations. By varying the level of monitoring and fines for noncompliance, the game shows students how the probability and severity of enforcement affects incentives for compliance. The game...

This article examines the factors that affect state adoption of environmental audit legislation and self-policing policies. The results of both a cross-section probit and a Weibull proportional hazard model suggest that political context and state-federal relationships are key factors in...

This paper presents a classroom game in which students trade pollution permits. By changing the distribution of permits across firms, the game shows students how the allocation of property rights determines the winners and losers in the permit trading system but does not affect the efficiency of...

To assess the role that consumers can play in encouraging environmental compliance, we examine the U.S. hazardous waste management industry to determine (1) whether environmental performance affects consumer demand and (2) whether markets affect compliance behavior. We find that noncompliance...

This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement in increasing the environmental and safety performance of U.S. natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline operators. The analysis combines data on federal regulatory inspections, enforcement actions,...

Regulation of hazardous waste and cleanup of contaminated sites are two major components of modern public policy for environmental protection. We review the literature on these related areas, with emphasis on empirical analyses. Researchers have identified many behavioral responses to regulation...

Facilities that self-police under the Environmental Protection Agency's Audit Policy are eligible for reduced penalties on disclosed violations. This paper investigates whether self-policing has additional consequences; in particular, whether self-policing reduces future enforcement activity....

Over the past two decades the role of private parties in the policing of environmental regulation has grown dramatically. In some cases the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has led the effort to involve private parties, either formally or informally. In other situations, private parties...

This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement in increasing the environmental and safety performance of U.S. natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline operators. The analysis combines data on federal regulatory inspections, enforcement actions,...