The interaction between social activists and politicians is modeled by a signaling game in which activists send messages and politicians interpret them, attempting to understand the activists' goals. These goals range between extreme radical and very moderate changes that activists wish to...

The paper offers a complex and systematic model of the bandwagon effect in collective action using continuous time equations. The model treats the bandwagon effect as a process influenced by ratio between the mobilization efforts of social activists and the resources invested by the government...

The paper suggests a theoretical game framework to explain collective action dynamics by learning processes. When a certain fact becomes common knowledge due to a certain event, people accumulate knowledge about the state of the world and act accordingly. We concentrate on a conceptual example...

We examine how group membership influences individual decisions with respect to joining a mass political struggle, under the assumption that group members have a strong group identity, expressed by a strong commitment to group decisions. We suggest a two-level theoretical game model in which, in...

Examines the conditions and different structural settings in which a retailer is likely to apply an international reference price strategy to an imported product. We define the term “international reference price” as an external reference price that reflects the product’s price in...

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine hostility as a mediator of the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics (POP) and counterproductive work behavior (CWB). Design/methodology/approach: The authors’ examined the mediation model using a sample of 171 full-time...