We study a model of transmission of continuous cultural traits across generations where children learn their cultural trait from their parents and their social environment modeled by a network. Parents can engage in the socialization process of their children by biasing links in the network in...

We study the formation of networks in environments where agents derive benefits from other agents directly linked to them but suffer losses through contagion when any agent on a path connected to them is hit by a shock. We first consider networks with undirected links (e.g. epidemics,...

This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not assume particular functional forms on players' payoffs. By exploiting variational methods, we show that the uniqueness,...

This paper investigates a model of strategic interactions in financial networks, where the decision by one agent on whether or not to default impacts the incentives of other agents to escape default. Agents' payoffs are determined by the clearing mechanism introduced in the seminal contribution...

We study the impact of research collaborations in coauthorship networks on research output and how optimal funding can maximize it. Through the links in the collaboration network, researchers create spillovers not only to their direct coauthors but also to researchers indirectly linked to them....

Social media are becoming increasingly important in our society and change the way people communicate, how they acquire information, and how they form beliefs. Experts are concerned that the rise of social media may make interaction and information exchange among like-minded individuals more...

In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...

We study properties of collective action problems bounded by minimal contributions as well as endowment and variable contributions are neighbourhood dependent. We relate nearness to non-interior agents and its implication for interior contribution. Here, we see the aspects of node distance to...

Most literature in strategic network formation shows that there is a substantial tension between stability and efficiency. In this note, I show that such is not the case in the twoway flow model with small decay studied by Bala and Goyal (2000a) and De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015). Specifically,...

In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of...