The important flows of irregular migration could not exist without the emergence of a criminal market for smuggling services. A matching model à la Pissarides (2000) provides a well-suited framework to analyze such a flow market with significant trade frictions. Our analysis considers the...

This paper proposes a two-country model of migration in a transferable skill sector, where workers education is provided free of charge by governments. We study firstly the non-cooperative equilibrium where the poor country decides on the education level and the rich country decides on the quota...

This paper analyses the impact of migrant remittances on the supply of labour of beneficiaries in a developing country. The model is cast as a two period game between a resident and an altruistic migrant, under imperfect information of the latter about the true economic situation of the former....

Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left-home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that if migrants' income is private information, unsuccessful...

This paper proposes a two-country model of migration in a transferable skill sector, where workers'education is provided free of charge by governments. We study firstly the non-cooperative equilibrium where the poor country decides on the education level and the rich country decides on the quota...

This paper analyses the relationship between regular and irregular migration taking into account the migration network effect and the network creation mechanism. We assume that migrants can obtain a high payoff only if a critical mass of migrants is reached in the destination country. If...