We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general finite-period games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games...

In an information transmission situation, a sender's concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible power to control the receiver's decisions so that the sender can manipulate information without being detected. In this case, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without...

A pillage game is a coalitional game as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game. Players are located in regions and can travel from one region to another. The players can form a coalition and combine their power only within their...

Crawford and Sobel (1982) developed a model of strategic information transmission in which a better-informed sender sends a possibly informative signal to a decision-making receiver and studied how strategically transmitted information is related to the analogy between the two players'...

A pillage game is a coalitional game that is meant to be a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game by assuming that players are located in regions. Players can travel from one region to another in one move and can form a coalition...

This paper studies the possibility of cooperation based on players' preferences. Consider the following infinitely repeated game, similar to Ghosh and Ray (1996). At each stage, uncountable numbers of players are randomly matched without information about their partners' past actions and play a...

We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate information through the media to influence receivers. We show that if there is only one sender who has a conditional preference for maintaining its credibility in reporting accurate information and if the receivers face a...