We study a coordination game where players simultaneously acquire information prior to the play of the game. We allow general information acquisition technologies, modeled by a cost functional mapping from information structures. Costly local distinguishability is a property requiring that the...

We study a dynamic contracting problem in which the principal can allocate his limited capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or that contradicts the agent's effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. Such flexibility calls for jointly designed monitoring and compensation schemes...

We study optimal disclosure rules that alleviate inefficiencies caused by managerial private benefits. An entrepreneur raises capital from investors by designing a security and an associated covenant. The covenant allocates the control right of the project to the entrepreneur or investors in the...

An issuer designs a contract and agents flexibly acquire information when deciding whether to accept it and provide liquidity. Unlike the existing literature, we do not impose any physical restriction on information structure to capture the idea of flexible information acquisition. Facing an...