seller with no means to signal his quality has the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to … discover the true quality and can credibly commit to a disclosure rule. We study the incentives of this institution to disclose …

the monopoly price. We characterize two pooling equilibria. In both equilibria, a high-quality firm on average has a … considering the informational role of a queue in a setting in which a firm can also adjust its price to signal its quality to … uninformed consumers. When the proportion of informed consumers is low, to separate on price a high-quality firm must raise its …

consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over … quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is … necessary. The outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling. Lower-quality firms need to provide more …

quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck … could induce her to stop selling. When she knows her quality, a good seller never stops selling. Furthermore, a seller with …

upstream monopolist to limit output to monopoly levels, whereas a disintegrated structure will ‘over-sell’, producing more in … is, supply less than their monopoly output. Low-cost firms continue to over-sell, so all types of firms have a reason to …