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Ichihashi, Shota; Smolin, Alex - 2022

A seller faces a consumer with an uncertain value for the product. The seller has imperfect private information about the value and requests additional data to set the price. The consumer can decline any request. The consumer's willingness to provide data depends on his belief about the seller's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013291354

Selling Information

Zhong, Weijie - 2017

In this paper I studied the optimal mechanism in selling information to decision makers with private prior knowledge about the payoff relevant state. When the underlying decision problem has a continuum of actions, the optimal mechanism will be a continuum menu of experiments with decreasing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949135

Information Design in Optimal Auctions

Chen, Yi-Chun; Yang, Xiangqian - 2020

We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private value. Assuming that the seller adopts Myerson (1981) optimal auction in response, we characterize both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014094506

Monopoly, Product Quality and Information Disclosure

Shi, Fanqi; Zhang, Yutong - 2021

product and reveal theone of highest realized quality. The key insight is that information disclosurecan facilitate surplus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245003

Persuasive silence

Suzuki, Toru - 2012

. -- Signaling game ; Consideration set ; Counter signaling ; Limited attention ; Marketing ; Advertising …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009516790

Advertising Signaling and Social Learning : The Case of the Motion Picture Industry

Liu, Haiyan - 2017

advertising to signal product quality. I present an equilibrium model that describes both consumers' and firms' learning and … -- reaching consumers and signaling product quality. I apply the model to the U.S. motion picture theatrical market where … of advertising spending for movies in my sample is used for signaling product quality, while 73 percent is used for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964823

Only Time Will Tell : Credible Dynamic Signaling

Starkov, Egor - 2020

dynamic price signaling and show that prices may be informative of product quality even if the seller cannot commit to future …This paper explores a model of dynamic signaling without commitment. It is known that separating equilibria do not … signal. This paper, however, shows that informative and payoff-relevant signaling can occur even without commitment and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826394

Signaling a New Version in Durable-Good Oligopoly

Caylor, William - 2018

signaled through prices; the signaling distortion may lead to higher or lower prices and therefore decrease or increase welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920962

Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining

Zhang, Jun - 2016

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366

The Optimal Choice of Pre-Launch Reviewer

Gill, David - 2015

We develop a framework in which: (i) a firm can have a new product tested publicly before launch; and (ii) tests vary in toughness, holding expertise fixed. Price flexibility boosts the strong positive impact on consumer beliefs of passing a tough test and mitigates the strong negative impact of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039455