We study the effect on cost overruns of auction formats (average bid as opposed to …first price rule) conditional on the entry mechanisms (open as opposed to restricted participation). The dataset is a panel of auctions held in the Italian Veneto region between 2004 and 2006. It includes small...

We study the effect on cost overruns of two different auction formats, the first price sealed bid and the average bid, conditional on whether entry is open or restricted. The first price format awards the contract to the lowest bid, while the average bid format awards the contract to the bid...

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constrained optimal award procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences are more pronounced for a fancy than a standard...

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award procedure when the procurer cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences are more pronounced for more complex designs, it is optimal to fix a simple design ex ante and to...

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award procedure when the procurer cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences are more pronounced for more complex designs, it is optimal to fix a simple design ex ante and to...

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constrained optimal award procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences are more pronounced for a fancy than a standard...

This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using a quasi-linear scoring rule. Suppliers have private information about their costs, which is summarized by a multi-dimensional type. The scoring rule reduces the multidimensional...

Raising the public administration's efficiency is, without any doubt, one of the greatest challenges nowadays in Brazil. The State's technical and allocative efficiency dimensions necessarily require efficiency of public agencies in the acquisition of inputs for their production and supply...

In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each firm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be...