We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting bailouts may signal firms' financial troubles and worsen subsequent financing conditions. Bailout stigma can lead to low or even no take-up of otherwise attractive bailout offers, the failure of immediate market revival, or a government...

We study the Generalized Second Price auctions – a standard method for allocating online search advertising – experimentally, considering both the static environment assumed by the prevailing theory and a dynamic game capturing the salient aspects of real-world search advertising auctions....

We compare different methods of assigning ownership of a good when some agents are wealth-constrained. When a good is sold at the market-clearing price, a high-wealth individual may buy it but a low-wealth (or illiquid) individual may not, even if the latter individual would have the higher...

Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when...

This paper studies alternative contract damage measures in the presence of specific investments that generate a direct benefit to the investor's trading partner (referred to as "cooperative investments"). We find that, both with and without the possibility of ex post renegotiation, (i) the...

This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N plaintiffs when there are Fixed costs of litigation. When making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the plaintiffs, the defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy. Plaintiffs settle their claims for less...

We study decentralized colleges admissions in the face of uncertain student preferences. Enrollment uncertainty causes colleges to strategically target their admissions, forgoing students sought after by others and seeking students overlooked by others. When students' types are multidimensional,...

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept---robust equilibrium---that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by the applicant-proposing Deferred...

This article studies the strategic use of collective negotiation in multiplaintiff litigation. Compared with one-on-one negotiation, collective negotiation can change the distribution of per-plaintiff damages in a manner that influences the defendant's bargaining incentive. Informational...

Utilizing a novel dataset from an online travel intermediary, we study the effects of EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The opt-in requirement of GDPR resulted in 12.5% drop in the intermediary-observed consumers, but the remaining consumers are trackable for a longer period of...