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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610224
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631386
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We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202241
Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players’ infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165948
Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817216
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577753
The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049719