In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such...

This paper provides a unified approach to equilibrium analysis in models for competing mechanisms (e.g., Szentes (2009), Yamashita (2010)), which may differ in terms of delegation of action choice, announcement of mechanisms, observability of messages, and equilibrium notions

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on specific rules that allocate authority among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. Based on a notion of stochastic blocking, we extend...

Given the regularity condition on posteriors proposed in Lehrer and Samet (2011), we show that Lehrer and Sametʼs (2011) characterization of agreeing to agree in countable-information models cannot be extended to uncountable-information models. This answers an open question raised in Lehrer and...

Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one's rivals may be countered by the rivals' threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of production economies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hindered competitive behaviors as a coalition's attempt to...