We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model in which we derive conditions for separating the savings decision from the asset allocation decision. It is shown that with logarithmic utility functions this separation holds for any heterogeneity of discount factors while the generalization to...

We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-termreversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...

We consider a closed economy where a risk neutral bank competes with a competitive bond market. Firms can finance a risky project either by a bank credit or by issuing a bond which is directly sold to risk averse investors who also can hold safe deposits at the bank. We show that a monopolistic...

We study collective decision-making procedures involving the formation of an agenda of issues and the subsequent vote on the position for each issue on the agenda. Issues that are not on the agenda remain unsettled. We use a protocol-free equilibrium concept introduced by Dutta et al. (2004) and...

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. We show that a well-known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the...