Authors who consider efficient bargaining on the labor market predominantly focus on the Nash-bargaining solution. It seems, however, that actual labor market negotiations between an employers' federation and a labor union are often characterized by mutual concessions, which may be accounted for...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect publicmonitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfectBayesian Nash equilibrium ...

We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals' information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find...

We consider a simple CAPM with heterogenous expectations on assets' mean returns and homogenous expectations on the covariance of returns. In this model alpha-opportunities naturally arise in a financial market equilibrium. We show that that the hunt for alpha-opportunities is a zero-sum game...

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model in which we derive conditions for separating the savings decision from the asset allocation decision. It is shown that with logarithmic utility functions this separation holds for any heterogeneity of discount factors while the generalization to...

We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-termreversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...