Using detailed options holdings, we examine how mutual funds' use of options affects performance and risk. Using options generates, on average, no performance advantages. In fact, funds that follow certain distinct strategies underperformed. The only salutary impact is lower portfolio risk for a...

US equity mutual funds, on average, prefer realization of capital losses to capital gains. Nevertheless, a substantial fraction exhibits the disposition effect of realizing gains more readily than losses. My analysis suggests that learning effects have reduced the manifestation of the...

We introduce a new measure to assess the valuation skills of investment-grade corporate bond funds. Our measure recognizes funds that ex-ante hold a higher fraction of undervalued bonds as having better valuation skills. The measure predicts future fund performance, is stable over time, and is...

We study the dispersion of month-end valuations placed on identical corporatebonds by different mutual funds. Such dispersion is related to bond-specificcharacteristics associated with liquidity and market volatility. TRACE may havecontributed to the general decline in dispersion over our sample...

Using detailed holdings of exchange-traded options, we examine how mutual funds use optionsand how options affect portfolio performance and risk. Options users underperform nonusers bytwo to three percent per year. The underperformance is especially pronounced for funds that areheavy users of...

US equity mutual funds, on average, prefer realization of capital losses to capital gains. Nevertheless,a substantial fraction exhibits the disposition effect of realizing gains more readily than losses. Myanalysis suggests that learning effects have reduced the manifestation of the disposition...

This is the first study of corporate-bond mutual fund performance that examines detailedsecurity-level holdings and returns. The new database allows us to decompose the costsand benefits of active management. In contrast to prior research on equity funds thatshows evidence of stock-selection...

Using 13F position valuations, we show that hedge fund advisors intentionallymismark their stock positions. We document manipulation even after eliminatingissues inherent in the pricing of illiquid securities. The documented mismarking isrelated to hedge fund incentives. Mismarking is more...

Using 13F position valuations, we show that hedge fund advisors intentionally mismark their stock positions. We document manipulation even after eliminating issues inherent in the pricing of illiquid securities. Hedge fund advisors mark their positions up (down) following poor (good) performance...