In the analysis of group identification, Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), Logique Analyse 160, 385-395, have shown that any method to aggregate the opinions of a group of agents about the individuals in the group that posses a specific attribute, such as race, nationality, profession, etc., must be...

This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two-party electoral competition game when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous payoffs, this game,...

This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is...

We study both theoretically and experimentally the complete set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional, majority rule election game with two candidates, who might be interested in power as well as in ideology, but not necessarily in the same way. Apart from obtaining the well known...