This paper examines the reliability of option fair value estimates in the presence of transaction costs. The Black Scholes Merton (BSM) framework assumes zero transaction costs and thus might not provide a reasonable approximation in this context. We investigate the model adjustments companies...

This paper determines the cost of employee stock options (ESOs) to shareholders. I present a pricing method that seeks to replicate the empirics of exercise and cancellation as good as possible. In a first step, an intensity-based pricing model of El Karoui and Martellini is adapted to the needs...

We derive a simple formula for the cost of the ESO to the firm at the grant date under the assumption that the executive has a constant market-to-strike multiple. The market-to-strike multiple is defined as the ratio of the market price on exercise to the strike price of the ESO. The expected...

It is well documented in the empirical literature that employee stock options exercise behavior is driven by economic/rational factors as well as by psychological/behavioral factors. The latter include a set of behavioral biases affecting attitudes towards risk. Perhaps the most comprehensive...

We investigate the impact of independent valuation specialists on the downward bias of pre-initial public offering employee stock option valuations. Undervalued stock price estimates underlying firms' option grants produce option valuations that overstate earnings and provide employees with deep...

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards...

This study examines practitioners' perceptions of uses of stock option compensation expense. Specifically, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 123(R) requires firms to report the estimated fair value of stock option compensation as an expense over the employees' required...

This study provides new evidence on the relation between institutional ownership and the equity incentives provided to CEOs by their portfolio holdings of stock and stock options. We show that when firms' CEOs have abnormally high equity incentives, higher institutional ownership is associated...

I analyze the long-run performance and earnings management behavior of equity carve-outs conditioned on whether the executives received incentive stock options at the IPO date. Carve-outs that did not grant incentive stock options subsequently underperform both relative to the overall market and...

In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...