Empirical evidence shows that backdating of executive stock option grants was prevalent, particularly at firms with highly volatile stock prices. Executives who have the opportunity to backdate should take this into account in their valuation. We quantify the value to a risk averse executive of...

We design and derive a pricing model for an executive stock option with a strike price indexed to a benchmark and investigate its valuation and incentive implications. In both up and down markets, the indexed option filters out common risks beyond the executive's control, thereby increasing the...

We examine the value and incentive effects of six nontraditional executive stock options: premium options,performance-vested options, repriceable options, purchased options, reload options, and indexed options. With reasonable parameter values, four options have lower value than a traditional...

I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in...

Explicit relative performance awards (RPE) have become an important component of executive compensation. We calculate the value and incentives of explicit RPE awards and find that RPE awards that use a custom peer group are structured both in terms of the peer group and payout design to filter...

This paper studies incentives in a dynamic contracting framework of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, while shareholders choose initially optimal leverage and ex-post optimal default policies. Notably, a resource constraint that binds the...

We study derivative instruments that corporate insiders use to diversify and hedge their equity ownership. Our evidence suggests that boards might allow use of these instruments in order to mitigate agency costs associated with overvalued equity and high equity-based pay. These instruments are...

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs' and firms' outside options and captures...

Much of the agency literature focuses on effort-inducing while little attention is paid to the participation constraint. Intuitively, it is important to jointly address both for CEOs. This paper achieves this by developing a dynamic search equilibrium model which allows for quitting if a CEO is...

It is often argued that Black-Scholes (1973) values overstate the subjective value of stock options granted to risk-averse and under-diversified executives. We construct a quot;representativequot; Swiss executive and extend the certainty-equivalence approach presented by Hall and Murphy (2002)...