This document analyses the effects of ageing populations upon public finances. More specifically, it focuses on the implications of ageing for acute health care, long-term care, and public pension expenditure. It does so for 15 EU countries.  It pays particular attention to three novel...

It is well-known that co-payments in health insurance may increase social welfare by reducing moral hazard. Considerably less is known about the form co-payment schemes should ideally take. This paper investigates what co-payment rate and co-payment maximum characterize the optimal scheme,...

Intergenerational risk sharing by funded pension schemes may increase welfare in an ex ante sense. However, it also suffers from a time inconsistency problem. In particular, young generations may be unwilling to start participating in a pension scheme if this requires them to make huge transfers...

Collective funded pension schemes with defined benefits (DB) raise welfare through intergenerational risk sharing, but may lower welfare through distortion of the labour-leisure decision. This paper compares the welfare gains with the welfare losses. In many countries, collective funded pension...

This paper explores the welfare effects of a number of collective pension contracts, distinguishing between the two welfare effects. We find that collective schemes can be either superior or inferior to individual schemes. Collective pension contracts allow for intergenerational risk sharing...

Most health insurance schemes use some sort of cost sharing to curb the moral hazard that is inherent to insurance. It is common to limit this cost sharing, by applying a deductible or a stop loss, for example. This can be motivated from an insurance perspective: without a cap, coinsurance...