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Brothers in arms : an experiment on the alliance puzzle
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2010
would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among "brothers in arms" when fighting … against the external enemy. -- alliance ; conflict ; contest ; free-riding ; hold-up problem ; solidarity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008808262
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Brothers in arms : an experiment on the alliance puzzle
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2010
would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among "brothers in arms" when fighting … against the external enemy. -- Alliance ; conflict ; contest ; free-riding ; hold-up problem ; solidarity … viel weniger stark ausgeprägt, als es die nicht-kooperative Theorie erwarten lassen würde. Diese Solidarität zwischen den …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009408122
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Brothers in arms: An experiment on the alliance puzzle
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2010
would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among 'brothers in arms' when fighting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274925
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Brothers in arms : an experiment on the alliance puzzle
Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2012
this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former brothers in arms fight even more … equally and peacefully. -- Alliance ; Conflict ; Contest ; Free-riding ; Hold-up problem ; In-group solidarity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009671102
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Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of the international conflict
Tangerås, Thomas P. (contributor) - 2008
This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i )...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003723925
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Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry
Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392
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Inefficient group organization as optimal adaption to dominant environments
Kolmar, Martin; Wagener, Andreas - 2010
Contests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008653415
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Political Free Riding
Barry, Jordan M. - 2012
There are two basic reasons why a citizen may choose to engage in political activity: She may wish to achieve particular results (“extrinsic motivations”) or she may simply enjoy engaging in the political activity itself (“intrinsic motivations”). However, most citizens’ ability to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014172376
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Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games
Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - 2012
Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191492
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International trade and transnational insecurity : how comparative advantage and power are jointly determined
Garfinkel, Michelle Robin; Skaperdas, Stergios; … - 2009
We augment the canonical neoclassical model of trade to allow for interstate disputes over land, oil, water, or other resources. The costs of such disputes in terms of arming depend on the trade regime in place. Under either autarky or free trade, the larger country (in terms of factor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850881