We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the …

The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of an allocation that is fair, when the preferences of all agents … assignments of object be necessarily feasible. An allocation is said to be fair, if it is Pareto optimal and no individual prefers … necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair allocation is that the feasible set of assignments contain an …

We study the indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer, in which each object is endowed with a … priority structures that admit a stable, efficient and (group) strategy-proof rule. While house allocation problems and housing … markets are two classic families of allocation problems that admit a stable, efficient and group strategy-proof rule, any …

We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism … mechanism. We confront subjects with situations in which theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport …