This text presents a simple contracting model that captures the role of equity as a safety valve, and shows how it can solve problems posed by opportunists. It also shows that it is often preferable to limit equity, reserving it for use only against those who appear sufficiently likely to be...

In their indisposed paper, Aswani, Raghunandan, and Rajgopal (ARR) provide a critique of our main findings on the pricing of carbon transition risk in Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021a, 2021b, 2022) and in Bolton, Halem, and Kacperczyk (2022). We take exception to the key elements of their critique....

In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Following recent contributions in the property law literature, we emphasize the distinction between contractual rights, that are only enforceable against the parties themselves, and property rights,...

In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Following recent contributions in the property law literature, we emphasize the distinction between contractual rights, that are only enforceable against the parties themselves, and property rights,...

In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Following recent contributions in the property law literature, we emphasize the distinction between contractual rights, that are only enforceable against the parties themselves, and property rights,...

This article adopts a definition of property rights from legal scholarship: A property right (in contrast to a contractual right) is enforceable, not only against the parties to a contract, but also against third parties outside the contract. In a financial contracting setting, we ask: When...