We characterize a monopolist's optimal offer of service plans when only informed customers know already at the contracting stage whether their demand is high or low, while uninformed customers may learn their demand only after incurring some costs, if at all. While informed customers purchase...

Contractual and regulatory provisions for access affect incentives to invest in an upgraded network and, in particular, a next-generation access network. Investment decisions are made under uncertainty and have to be made over time. This papers provides a framework for taking uncertainty, risk...

Die Netzstrukturen im Bereich der Telekommunikation entwickeln sich weiter und erfordern neue Investitionen. Die notwendige Regulierung kann dabei verschiedene Formen annehmen und zu unterschiedlichen Zeitpunkten ansetzen. Die Autoren beschreiben die Netzinfrastruktur in Deutschland und zeigen...

We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...