We develop a general equilibrium model of trade between identical countries. The model is similar to a 2x2x2 Heckser-Ohlin model, but the factors of production, skilled and unskilled labor, are endogenously determined from human capital investments by the workers. Firms are only able to observe...

We consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages, where discrimination between ex ante identical groups is sustainable in equilibrium. An affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may "fail" in the sense that there still may be equilibria where...

This paper addresses a fundamental, yet unresolved, question: is statistical discrimination a market failure? I consider the problem for a utilitarian social planner who operates in an environment with imperfectly observable human capital investments. It is found that the informational problem...

The finite horizon version of a popular legislative bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn is investigated. With three or more rounds of bargaining a continuum of distributions are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria in Markov strategies. Allowing for history dependent strategies...

This paper studies "voluntary bargaining agreements" in an environment where preferences over an excludable public good are private information. Unlike the case with a non-excludable public good, there are non-trivial conditions when there is significant provision in a large economy. The...

We study an economy with private and public sectors in which workers invest in imperfectly observable skills that are important to the private sector but not to the public sector. Government regulation allows native majority workers to be employed in the public sector with positive probability...

I consider a directed search model with population uncertainty. Buyers and sellers are randomly drawn from independent Poisson distributions. This provides a simple justification for the usual equilibrium selection where only symmetric randomizations by buyers are considered, because any...

This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce...