This paper studies the role of bundling in the efficient provision of excludable public goods. We show that bundling in the provision of unrelated public goods can enhance social welfare. With a large number of goods and agents, first best can be approximated with pure bundling. For a parametric...

This paper asks whether statistical discrimination is a market failure. I consider the problem for a utilitarian social planner who operates in an environment that can generate statistical discrimination as an equilibrium phenomenon. It is found that there are potential efficiency gains from...

the private good improves economic efficiency under a condition that is always fulfilled under stochastic independence and satisfied for an open set of joint distributions. Our model is an example where there is an efficiency loss from separating revenue and expenditure problems, and is...

This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods. For a class of problems with symmetric goods and binary valuations, we show that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of...

Constrained efficient provision of an excludable public good is studied in a model where preferences are private information. The provision level is asymptotically deterministic, making it possible to approximate the optimal mechanism with a mechanism that provides a fixed quantity of the good...

This paper asks whether statistical discrimination is a market failure. I consider the problem for a utilitarian social planner who operates in an environment that can generate statistical discrimination as an equilibrium phenomenon. It is found that there are potential efficiency gains from...