Purpose This paper focuses on how the producer inspires his cooperative research partner to reduce carbon emission, by developing a menu of incentive contracts both in research and development (R&D) stage and recycling stage. Design/methodology/approach The proposed mechanism combines the...

Purpose This paper aims to examine empirically the role of toeholds in reducing asymmetric information in mergers and acquisitions by establishing a relationship between the toehold and some relevant characteristics of the acquiring and the target firm. Design/methodology/approach A regression...

Purpose The ineffectiveness of external governance mechanisms (laws and regulations) designed to curb insider trading in Malaysia leads this study to focus on the role of internal governance of firms in helping to reduce insider trading incidences. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test for the existence of residual moral hazard in the three largest US reinsurance markets over the period 1995‐2000 and examine the effectiveness of retention limit, experience rating and long‐term contracting relationship in controlling for...

Purpose – Inspired by the recent opening up of the Chinese banking market and by the ensuing location strategies adopted by foreign banks, the purpose of this paper is to develop an empirical analysis on location strategies. The paper enriches the existing literature by including many...

Cover -- Half-Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- PART 1. Specificities of IS within Asymmetric Alliances -- Introduction to Part 1 -- 1. Strategic Alliances versus Asymmetric Alliances -- 1.1. Strategic alliances -- 1.1.1. Definition -- 1.1.2....

CONTEXTA Basis for ManagementInformation ValueInformation and WorkInformation and ManagementInformation and OrganizationInformation as Corporate MemoryInformation Is the EnterpriseInformation as Capital AssetEnhancing Information's ValueConsequencesConclusionsRemoving HindrancesUnavailable...

We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. If the first period proposal fails, the game ends immediately with an exogenously given "breakdown" probability....