This paper shows that with a strong labour union, bargaining over piece rate generates higher social welfare than … bargaining over fixed wage. Moreover, this social welfare exceeds the social welfare under efficient bargaining level, if the … union is very strong. …

We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over … wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate … wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium …

This note develops a model of two stage game between a corrupt trade union leader and the management of the firm where … the former negotiates for the wage of the workers with the firm. The firm bribes the leader so that he keeps the wage as …

firm play a two-stage Nash bargaining game from where equilibrium unionized wage and the bribe are determined. The analysis … charges a bribe from the firm to keep the wage close to this level. The corrupt trade union leader and the management of the …This paper develops a model of determination of unionized wage in the presence of both collective bargaining and …

's preference for tax revenues, its incentive to privatize a public firm depends on the number of the private firms and (ii) social … incentive not to privatize the public firm, and vice versa if only the number of firms is sufficiently large. … welfare can decrease with an increase in the number of firms depending on the level of government's preference for tax revenue …

the previous literature. These results means that both the public firm and its union may or may not have different …This paper investigates Bertrand competition of unionized mixed duopoly when the public firm is less efficient than the … private firm, including endogenous imposition of the budget constraint on the public firm. Thus, we show that if the public …

's preference for tax revenues and the number of private firms, the government and the public firm do not always have an incentive … to privatize the public firm even if the government places lesser emphasis on the tax revenues than on social welfare …. Second, social welfare increases with an increased number of private firms regardless of the government's preference for tax …