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An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?

Borrero, Miguel; Rubio, Santiago J. - 2021

This paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an international environmental … agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they choose their levels of emissions. Two types of agreements are … studied, a complete agreement for which countries coordinate their decisions on adaptation and emissions, and an adaptation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012519985

Self-enforcing climate coalitions for farsighted countries: integrated analysis of heterogeneous countries

Vosooghi, Sareh; Arvaniti, Maria; Ploeg, Frederick van der - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013272014

Overlapping climate clubs : self-enforcing R&D networks to mitigate global warming

Silva, Emilson C. D.; Yamaguchi, Chikara - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-24

Free riding incentives make it difficult to control climate change. To improve the chances of the Paris Agreement's ambitious goal, many nations are forming scientific networks in carbon capture and storage (CCS). These networks take many forms (bilateral, hub-and-spoke, and multilateral)....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171806

Adaptation and international environmental agreements

Masoudi, Nahid; Zaccour, Georges - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 71 (2018) 1, pp. 1-21

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011998540

Building climate coalitions on preferential free trade agreements

Kuhn, Thomas; Pestow, Radomir; Zenker, Anja - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 74 (2019) 2, pp. 539-569

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138207

Formation of climate coalitions and preferential free trade : the case for participation linkage

Kuhn, Thomas; Pestow, Radomir; Zenker, Anja - In: Environmental economics and policy studies : the … 26 (2024) 3, pp. 479-502

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014582979

The strategic role of adaptation in international environmental agreements

Rohrer, Anna Viktoria; Rubio, Santiago J. - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014583440

Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem : first come, but second served?

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca; Eyckmans, Johan - 2009

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008824487

The fatter the tail, the fatter the climate agreement : simulating the influence of fat tails in climate change damages on the success of international climate negotiations

Dekker, Thijs; Dellink, Rob; Ketterer, Janina - 2013

International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the 'fat tail', on the formation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009690831

The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions : A Game-Theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model

Bosetti, Valentina - 2012

This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116831