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The power of diversity over large solution spaces
LiCalzi, Marco; Surucu, Oktay - Dipartimento di Matematica Applicata, Università Ca' … - 2011
of the problem requires only a mild increase in the size of the team. Fourth, groupthink impairs the power of diversity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008873467
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The Power of Diversity over Large Solution Spaces
LiCalzi, Marco; Surucu, Oktay - In: Management Science 58 (2012) 7, pp. 1408-1421
solution of the problem requires only a mild increase in the size of the team. Fourth, groupthink impairs the power of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990452
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The Power of Diversity Over Large Solution Spaces
LiCalzi, Marco - 2011
of the problem requires only a mild increase in the size of the team. Fourth, groupthink impairs the power of diversity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123929
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The Power of Diversity Over Large Solution Spaces
LiCalzi, Marco; Sürücü, Oktay - 2012
of the problem requires only a mild increase in the size of the team. Fourth, groupthink impairs the power of diversity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041091
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502711
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506318
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510004
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023778
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023914
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025032