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The development and evolution of predatory-state institutions and organizations : beliefs, violence, conquest, coercion, and rent seeking
Benson, Bruce L. - In: Public choice 182 (2020) 3/4, pp. 303-329
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012230158
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Competitive elections, incumbency advantage, and accountability
Klingelhöfer, Jan - In: Economic theory 71 (2021) 4, pp. 1397-1428
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584489
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Corruption and politicians' horizon
Laurent, Hélène - In: Economics of governance 22 (2021) 1, pp. 65-91
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499676
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Corruption, judicial accountability and inequality : unfair procedures may benefit the worst-off
Berggren, Niclas; Bjørnskov, Christian - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 170 (2020), pp. 341-354
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012285783
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Corruption, judicial accountability and inequality : unfair procedures may benefit the worst-off
Berggren, Niclas; Bjørnskov, Christian - 2019
We ask whether, as many seem to think, corruption worsens, and judicial accountability improves, inequality, and … accountability to gross-income inequality and consumption inequality. The study shows that corruption is negatively, and that … judicial accountability is positively, related to both types of inequality. The estimates are particularly pronounced in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012137555
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Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament
Bernecker, Andreas - 2013
Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political rent-seeking behavior? For a microanalysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information of German members of parliament (MPs) and including attendance rates in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441834
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Political Rents in a Non-Corrupt Democracy
Svaleryd, Helena; Vlachos, Jonas - 2007
A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay. We develop a simple model where rents are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320026
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Corruption, judicial accountability and inequality: Unfair procedures may benefit the worst-off
Berggren, Niclas; Bjørnskov, Christian - 2019
We ask whether, as many seem to think, corruption worsens, and judicial accountability improves, inequality, and … accountability to gross-income inequality and consumption inequality. The study shows that corruption is negatively, and that … judicial accountability is positively, related to both types of inequality. The estimates are particularly pronounced in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012145536
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Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? : evidence from the German parliament
Bernecker, Andreas - 2013 - This version: July 2013
Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political rent-seeking behavior? For a microanalysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information of German members of parliament (MPs) and including attendance rates in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490268
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Political competition and legislative shirking in roll-call votes : evidence from Germany for 1953-2017
Frank, Marco; Stadelmann, David - In: Public choice 189 (2021) 3/4, pp. 555-575
We analyze the impact of elected competitors from the same constituency on legislative shirking in the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2017. The German electoral system ensures at least one federal legislator per constituency with a varying number of elected competitors between zero to four from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012659519