In contrast to Aryal, Perrigne and Vuong (2009), this note shows that in an insurance model with multidimensional screening when only information on whether the insuree has been involved in some accident is available, the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion is not identified.

In this paper, we address the identification and estimation of insurance models where insurees have private information about their risk and risk aversion. The model includes random damages and allows for several claims, while insurees choose from a finite number of coverages. We show that the...

In contrast to Aryal, Perrigne and Vuong (2009), this note shows that in an insurance model with multidimensional screening when only information on whether the insuree has been involved in some accident is available, the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion is not identi fied

This paper addresses the identification of insurance models with multidimensional screening where insurees have private information about their risk and risk aversion. The model includes a random damage and the possibility of several claims. Screening of insurees relies on their certainty...

In this paper we address the identification and estimation of insurance models where insurees have private information about their risk and risk aversion. The model includes random damage and allows for several claims, while insurees choose from a finite number of coverages. We show that the...

We introduce and analyze three definitions of equilibrium for finite extensive games with imperfect information and ambiguity averse players. In a setting where players' preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility as characterized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), our definitions...

In this paper I estimate a model of competitive nonlinear pricing with multidimensional adverse selection. I model competition using a Stackelberg duopoly and solve the multidimensional screening problem by aggregating the multidimensional type into a single dimensional type. I study...

We propose a method to nonparametriclly estimate the revenue under a auction that is efficient and resilient to collusion [Chen and Micali, 2012]. Efficiency is achieved on account of a lower revenue and we propose a method to quantify this efficiency-revenue trade-off, i.e. the extra cost for...