The effects of tariff wars on welfare are analysed for the case of trade between two countries with outputs of the traded good given exogenously. Assuming mild conditions, it is shown that if there are non-zero tariffs for which welfare-maximizing equilibrium holds, then free trade is not...

In the Edgeworth-Bertrand price game, each player has a capacity output, faces the same market demand, and calls out a price. The high-price caller gets some residual market at her price. The low-price caller gets her capacity at her price or all of the market. We re-work Beckmann's closed form...

We examine the long-run outcomes under free entry-exit when each firm not only takes account of the effects of her own entry-exit on the market structure but also takes full account of the effects due to other firms' simultaneous entry-exit. Adopting the framework of the theory of social...

This paper investigates a class of dynamic selection processes for n-person normal-form games which includes the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. For (two-person) zero-sum games and for (n-person) potential games every limit set of these dynamics is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria....

We study the wage negotiation model of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) under the "Good Faith Bargaining" (GFB) rule, where a party may not demand more than it has previously demanded. The GFB rule significantly restricts feasible strategies, but at the same time, makes...

In this work we study situations in which communication among the players is not complete and it is represented by a family of subsets of the set of players. Although several models of partial cooperation have been proposed, we shall follow a model derived from the work of Faigle and Kern. We...

The paper presents a coalition-structure value that is meant to capture outside options of players in a cooperative game. It deviates from the Aumann-Drèze value by violating the null-player axiom. We use this value as a power index and apply it to weighted majority games.

In government procurement auctions, discrimination in favor of one group of participants (e.g. domestic firms, minority bidders) over another group is a common practice. The optimal discriminatory rules for these auctions are typically non-linear and could be administratively complex and costly...

It is widely recognized that the shape of networks influences both individual and aggregate behavior. This raises the question which types of networks are likely to arise. In this paper we investigate a model of network formation, where players are divided into groups and the costs of a link...

In this paper we give an overview of various methods used to study cooperation within a set of players. Besides the classical games with transferable utility and games without transferable utility, recently new models have been proposed: the coalition formation games. In these, each player has...